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IntroductionThe disorder which occurred in England in 2011 was quickly dubbed ‘the consumer riots’.As explanations were sought for the disturbances, ‘the same predictable debate sprangup in politics, popular culture and academia’ (Hall 2012:146) as to whether the riots werea political reaction against social exclusion, poverty and discriminatory policing; theactions of ‘defective and disqualified consumers’ (Bauman 2011; Akram 2014; Treadwellet al 2013:1); or a product of broken homes, moral decline and gang culture - what thePrime Minister condemned as ‘criminality, pure and simple’ (Cameron 2011: Col. 1051).Much less attention has been given to the responses of the criminal justice system. Thejudiciary not only increased the penalties imposed on rioters but also abandoned thesentencing guidelines that should have acted as a restraint on its punitive impulses(Roberts 2012; Ashworth 2012). Whilst these exemplary sentences attracted concern,this article offers an empirically-grounded analysis of how the uplift in sentencing was afeature of every stage of the process for riot-related offending; a factor that does notappear to have been considered in determining the greater quantum in sentencing or inanalyses of the sentences. As Stenning has argued, ‘the sentencing process may be morerealistically conceived as beginning with the decision to lay charges and ending with thecompletion of any sentence imposed, rather than simply as a stage in the trial process thatfollows the verdict or guilty plea’ (2008:197). Thus the sentences imposed need to beconsidered in the context of police decision making and, in particular, the increasinglyproactive and adversarial involvement of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). Finallythe article demonstrates the lacuna in guidance following the Court of Appeal judgmentin Blackshaw (2011) and the Sentencing Council’s Guideline on Burglary (2011) to arguefor a more carefully calibrated approach to future sentencing involving offences occurringduring periods of social disorder.
The BackgroundOn Thursday 4 August 2011, armed Metropolitan Police officers shot dead a suspectnamed Mark Duggan. Following peaceful protests about this event, disturbances brokeout in Tottenham, north London, on the evening of Saturday 6 August. The disorderspread across 22 boroughs in the capital and to 20 police force areas in other Englishcities, ending in the early hours of Wednesday 10 August. Five people died, more than 300police officers were injured, 2,584 commercial premises were attacked, and at least 231crimes against domestic properties were recorded (HMIC 2011:13). The total costsincluding policing, clean-up operations, damage to property, losses to business and lost
1 Authors are arranged alphabetically. We would like to thank Professor Julian Roberts, ProfessorKieran McEvoy, Dr Elaine Dewhurst and the BJC reviewers for their helpful comments. We aregrateful to the Manchester Evening News for sharing its data; the views expressed are our own.
2tourism revenue, are estimated to be in the region of half a billion pounds (RiotsCommunities and Victims Panel 2012).In the year following the riots, 3,103 prosecutions were brought in relation to theseevents. By 31 August 2012, of the 2,158 convicted, all but twenty had been sentenced(Ministry of Justice 2012b). The vast majority of offending took place in London, followedby the West Midlands and Greater Manchester (MoJ 2012b). Although the overalloffending profiles were similar in the three main areas (see Figure 1), this obscures themuch more serious crimes that also took place in London and Birmingham.2
FIGURE 1 HEREAlthough shocking, the events were not unprecedented. There were riots across severalEnglish cities in 1981 and 1985 (Scarman 1981; Silverman 1986); in Bradford in 1995and again, along with several mill towns, in 2001 (Amin 2003; King and Waddington2004); and Birmingham in 2005 (King 2013). There had also been demonstrations inLondon in the previous year against both student tuition fees and public sector cuts thathad ended in violence (Lewis et al 2010; BBC 27 March 2011). Whilst some of the disorderand the responses to it appeared familiar, ‘the days following the initial disturbances inTottenham saw evidence of a type of systematic looting that did not appear to fit withprevious experience’ (Lewis et al 2011:8). Although the disturbances in London wereinitially associated with the Duggan shooting and the police handling of the situation, incomparison with previous riots, in most places, the majority of those involved seemed notto want to engage with the police, and the focus of the disturbances was primarilyacquisitive.3 The disorder of August 2011 was ‘unparalleled in terms of the speed, scaleand geographical spread of disorder’ (HMIC 2011:16). The media coverage was alsounmatched, with continuous reporting and commentary from traditional news outletsand the increased use of social media (Hohl et al 2013:13). ‘The endurance of thejudiciary, prosecutors and defence lawyers; the capacity of cells and the prisoner escortservice; the resourcefulness of court staff; even knowledge of the law: all were tested asnever before’ (Bawdon and Bowcott 2012). In response, the courts introduced all-nightand weekend sittings to deal with the numbers in custody that were praised by some, butothers criticised ‘the unprecedented night sittings describ[ing] them as kangaroo courts,dispensing "conveyor-belt justice"’ (Bawdon and Bowcott 2012). This in turn putpressure on defence representatives and the probation service at a time of year when
2 The riots came to be defined by the horrifying images from London, such as a woman leapingfrom an upstairs window of her burning home. Examples of these images of the disorder can befound at http://www.stylist.co.uk/life/london-riots-the-events-in-pictures. See also thenewspaper front pages for 9 August 2011 athttp://www.thepaperboy.com/uk/2011/08/09/front-pages-archive.cfm (last accessed 1 March2014). The disturbances in Birmingham raised particular concerns following the deaths of threemen run over by a car outside a mosque and an attempt to shoot down a police helicopter (BBC 10August 2011; Lewis and others 2014).3 The much smaller disorders that took place in Nottingham and Merseyside appeared to have adifferent offending profile, involving more disorder and less looting. The Chief Constable of GreaterManchester, Sir Peter Fahy said that ‘Certainly most of it in Manchester was about getting goods,breaking into places and stealing things. Salford I think was slightly different. It was more aboutattacking us and the fire services’ (Clifton and Allison 2011).
3most agencies are short-staffed due to summer holidays. A significant strain was also puton the prison estate (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales 2012).Sentencing formed an immediate and highly politicised part of the public debate aboutthe riots. Initial claims were made that suggested many of those involved did not fearconviction as they thought they would ‘only’ get a police caution or communitypunishment (Narain 2011; Smith 2011). The disorder occurred in the context of tensionin the Conservative Party over, then Justice Secretary, Kenneth Clarke’s plans to create a‘rehabilitation revolution’ in sentencing (Ministry of Justice 2010:1). During the disorder,senior politicians were criticised for appearing to suggest how the criminal justice systemshould deal with those involved,4 imperilling ‘the sacrosanct separation of powersbetween the government and the judiciary’ (Carlile 2011), although judges deniedyielding to such pressure (House of Commons Justice Committee 2011). Mediacommentary seemed polarised between those calling for the courts to ‘send a message’ todeter rioters; and shock at the severity of some of the sentences given for minor offences(Bowcott et al. 2011; Doyle 2011). Whilst the public seemed to support an increase insentences, they were less punitive than the courts (Hohl et al 2013; Roberts and Hough2013).Manchester is a useful region to study in terms of the riots. Most of the disorder occurredon 9 August, the majority of it in Manchester city centre and Salford Precinct. There wereincidents of violence in which masked groups of 200-300 people threw missiles, includingpetrol bombs, bricks and fireworks at the emergency services, buses and motorists.Vehicles and buildings were set alight and widespread looting of shopping centres tookplace (HMIC 2013). Whilst only 8 per cent (249) of defendants (Ministry of Justice 2012b)had a first hearing in Greater Manchester, the area processed the early offenders throughthe courts most quickly.5 In an unprecedented step, the Recorder of Manchester issued aform of guidelines for sentencing these cases (Carter & others 2011) that was followed inother courts; a practice that the Court of Appeal criticised but has not improved upon(Blackshaw 2011).This article draws upon two data sets: a national and a local one, to explore how the caseswere dealt with throughout the entire criminal justice process, rather than merelyfocusing on the sentencing outcome. The Ministry of Justice published regular statisticalbulletins about the riot sentencing (Ministry of Justice 2011, 2011a, 2012a, 2012b,2012c). These offer a wealth of demographic detail about offenders, such as age, ethnicityand previous convictions. The local data were collected by the court reporters of theregional newspaper, the Manchester Evening News (MEN),6 who attended court andrecorded data on those sentenced in Manchester in relation to the riots between 11
4 For example, the Prime Minister stated that: ‘Anyone charged with violent disorder and otherserious offences should expect to be remanded in custody, not let back on the streets; and anyoneconvicted should expect to go to jail’ (Cameron 2011: Col. 1052).5 The first defendants were sentenced on 10 August (MEN 11 August 2011). It was also thought tobe the first area to issue an anti-social behaviour order in relation to the disorder (BBC News 29September 2011).6 There is an interesting history of newspapers investigating public disorder. The Guardian-LSEstudy of the 2011 riots was inspired by the collaboration between the Detroit Free Pressnewspaper and Michigan’s Institute for Social Research after the 1967 Detroit riots (Lewis et al.2011:9).
4August 2011 and 9 January 2012. The MEN then shared them with the first named authorafter collection for further analysis.7 We had no control over the data collection and weretold that the 110 cases provided a complete census. Having compared the data with theMinistry of Justice figures, we realised that that data were incomplete. Furtherexploration of these missing cases established that the data relate to about 63% of thetotal who appeared in court in Manchester over that period.8 As the offending detail is inline with the Ministry of Justice data,9 we are broadly satisfied that rest of the data missingis due to the difficulties in managing the overwhelming10 number of defendants, ratherthan excluding any particular type of case, other than juveniles. The MEN data, whilstincomplete, offers finer detail and further insight into the processing of these cases by thecriminal justice system than can be gleaned from the MoJ data alone, so we have includedit for exploratory and illustrative purposes.
Decisions relating to Arrest and ChargeThere has been much discussion of the police response to the riots, including their arrestdecisions (HMIC 2011; Riots, Communities and Victims Panel 2012).11 It is ‘an operationaldecision at the discretion of the individual constable’ whether to arrest a suspect (PACECode G, para 2.4) and there was a very public dispute between the President of theAssociation of Chief Police Officers and the Home Secretary about this during the riots(Newburn 2011). Myriad factors may affect decisions about arrest (see, for example,Sanders and Young 2012). On the first night of the disorder, the Metropolitan Policeadopted a policy of not arresting suspects at the scene due to insufficient staffing levels;this changed as more officers were drafted in (Home Affairs Committee 2011: para 41-47).Prosecutorial decisions are also discretionary. The former Attorney General, Sir HartleyShawcross (1951) famously said ‘It has never been the rule in this country - I hope it neverwill be - that suspected criminal offences must automatically be the subject ofprosecution’. Instead the CPS applies a two-stage test: first, the evidential stage (if there
7 See also XXXX (forthcoming).8 240 of the 249 cases that were dealt with in Manchester had had first hearings by 1 February2012 (MoJ 2012a; MoJ 2012b) and we identified press reports of four cases that concludedbetween the end dates of the MEN and MoJ data collection (9 January and 1 February). Three caseswere heard at other local magistrates’ courts, and the location was not recorded in two cases (MoJFOI request 5 November 2013, email on file with the authors). The main group missing is the 65juvenile defendants (MoJ 2012a) as the press is usually excluded from the youth courts (althoughthe reporters managed to get details of nine youth court cases, discussed below). We thus havedata for 110 out of a possible 175 cases (63%): 66% of adult cases (110 of 166) and an additional14% of juvenile cases (n=9).9 In both data sets the majority of offences comprised burglary or attempted burglary (56% in theMoJ 2012 data and 60% in the MEN data). Theft or handling stolen goods accounted for 13% of theMoJ cases compared to 16% classified as theft offences in the MEN. Violent and public orderoffences comprised 21% of the MoJ data and 16% of the MEN data.10 Sixty seven per cent of cases of the Manchester cases were dealt with in the first week (MoJ2011) and about eighty per cent in the first month (MoJ 2011). One night sitting at ManchesterMagistrates' Court saw three district judges process defendants in batches of three as they aimedto deal with the 117 defendants in custody (BBC 11 August 2011).11 Newburn (2013) noted that this was the first time that senior politicians (including the PrimeMinister, Home Secretary and the Mayor of London) had criticised police performance whilst riotswere on-going.
5is a realistic prospect of conviction); and second whether a prosecution is in the publicinterest. As Stenning (2008) argues, these decisions about arrest and charge affect thesentence ultimately passed. In ordinary circumstances, it is unlikely that any of thosesentenced in relation to the disorder would have been arrested, never mind charged, forexample for the theft of doughnuts, or accepting a stolen pair of shorts (MEN data).There has been remarkably little research undertaken into the practices and cultures ofthe CPS (Kirk 2014, McConville et al 1991; Quirk 2006). The decision in recent years ofgovernments to ‘rebalance the system in favour of victims, witnesses and communities’(Home Office 2002) has led to the CPS adopting a higher public profile and putting the‘needs of victims and witnesses at the heart of the criminal justice system’ – an approachthat arguably conflicts with its role as a disinterested prosecutor (Harris 2013). CPSdecision-making in relation to the riots has largely escaped scrutiny but, in an example of‘zealous advocacy’ (Smith 2012) unusual in an English prosecutor, the Chief CrownProsecutor for the north west said:Justice, when it’s swift, is most effective; it’s about ensuring that they see theshock and awe of the criminal justice system. Because we represent society,we want to ensure that society is reflected in our courtrooms and we wantthem to experience what they made us experience (Afzal 2011).The Chief Crown Prosecutor for London made the remarkable admission that there hadbeen no contingency planning for an event such as the disorder (Bawdon and Bowcott2012) but the CPS was swiftly involved in meetings of Cobra, the government'semergency committee; the Attorney General; and the senior presiding judge responsiblefor liaising between the judiciary, courts and government departments. In the first week,a special CPS unit was set up to deal exclusively with riot cases (Bawden and Bowcott2012).Decisions relating to charge were taken very quickly during the disorder. The police weregiven a draft form of words to include in the incomplete files they sent to the CPS fordecisions about charge. They were told to explain that the on-going nature of the disorderand the strain on police resources meant that enquiries could not be completed withinthe time limits and to recommend that charging decisions should be based on the lowerstandard of the ‘threshold test’12 (Operation Withern 2011). In guidance issued on 15August 2011, the CPS stated that ‘The serious overall impact of the disorder in August2011 has been such that prosecution will be in the public interest in all but the mostexceptional of circumstances’ (2011a). In effect, this statement suggested that asubstantial policy decision had been made at speed, without consultation that resulted inthese cases being treated differently to all other types of offending.This prosecutorial zeal had a particular effect on young suspects. When deciding whethera prosecution is in the public interest, prosecutors (who should be Youth Offender
12 This is used to charge a suspect where the prosecutor has reasonable suspicion that the suspecthas committed the offence but has insufficient evidence to apply the evidential stage of the FullCode Test. The prosecutor must have reasonable grounds for believing that further evidence willbecome available within a reasonable period; the seriousness or the circumstances of the casejustifies the making of an immediate charging decision, and that there are continuing substantialgrounds to object to bail (CPS 2013:11).
6Specialists) must take into account the interests of youngsters and should generally divertthose eligible from prosecution (CPS n.d.). This appears to have been over-ridden inrelation to the disorder, an approach which is potentially unlawful.13 Of all thoseprosecuted in relation to the disorder, 27 per cent were aged 11-17, with a further 26 percent aged 18-20 (MoJ 2012b:3). No data are given regarding the numbers diverted fromprosecution but we are aware of cases from the MEN data of very young suspects andtrivial offences that were pursued. These include an 11 year old who was convicted ofburglary having stolen a cap from a sports shop, and a 17 year old who, somewhatironically, was convicted of burglary having stolen an 'I Love Mcr' [Manchester] hoodedtop.The offence with which a suspect is charged can make a significant difference to sentence.Following the riots, most of the property offences related to stealing from commercialpremises. This could be charged either as theft, which carries a maximum sentence ofseven years, or as burglary of a non-dwelling, which can attract up to ten yearsimprisonment. The national figures showed that offences were charged as burglary ratherthan theft at a ratio of 3:1 (MoJ 2012c). The CPS issued guidance stating that those whotake part in public disorder which involves breaking into property intending to causecriminal damage or steal, should be charged with burglary in addition to any public orderoffence. The CPS also stated that even those who cannot be shown to have taken part inthe disorder should be charged with burglary rather than theft, ‘to reflect theunwarranted invasion of another's property and the serious context of the offence’ (CPS2011a). Such an approach represents a classic example of what Cohen (1985) referred toas both ‘net widening’ and ‘mesh thinning’. This labelling does not necessarily accord withthe everyday understanding of burglary. For example, an offender in Manchester walkedinto a patisserie after finding the door open, disliked the taste of an ice cream he hadmade, so handed it to a passer-by. He was convicted of burglary and sentenced to 16months imprisonment (Osuh 2011).Nobles and Schiff have examined the ‘impossibility of making the same communicationsin different systems’ (2000:1), in particular the media and the criminal justice system,which can use the same terminology but understand it in very different ways. During the2011 disorder, the criminal justice system dealt with events in the face of intense mediainterest but in dissimilar terms. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a riot as ‘anoutbreak of active lawlessness or disorder among the populace’ and this was thepreferred term in the media discourse.14 Section 1 of the Public Order Act 1986 definesriot as:Where 12 or more persons who are present together use or threaten unlawfulviolence for a common purpose and the conduct of them (taken together) is such
13 A decision whether to prosecute a youth offender is open to judicial review if it can bedemonstrated that the decision was made regardless of, or clearly contrary to, a settled policy ofthe Director of Public Prosecutions (R v Chief Constable of Kent and another ex parte L, R v DPP ex
parte B [1991] 93 Cr App R 416).14 The British Insurance Brokers Association noted that the Government did not use the term 'riot'in any public conversation, suggesting that this may have been to avoid liability under the Riot(Damages) Act 1886 (Home Affairs Committee 2011, para 63) – although the government agreedshortly after the disorder ended that compensation would be paid (Cameron 2011 col. 1053).
7as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for hispersonal safety, each of the persons using unlawful violence for the commonpurpose is guilty of riot.It is immaterial whether or not the twelve or more people use or threaten unlawfulviolence simultaneously (s2); the common purpose may be inferred from their conduct(s3). This definition includes violent conduct towards property (s8(a)). No person (ofreasonable firmness or otherwise) needs to be present (s4) and it is not necessary forinjury or damage to occur (s8(b)).CPS Guidance affirmed that, although generally riot should be prosecuted only in the mostexceptional circumstances, ‘the extreme nature and effect of the outbreaks of violence andlawlessness that have characterised the August 2011 events are such that the offence ofRiot merits serious consideration’ (CPS 2011a). Despite the apparent appropriateness ofthe charge, we have found only sixteen reported convictions for riot – all but one relatingto two specific incidents.15 This differed from the Bradford riots, when the majority ofover 100 defendants were sentenced for riot (Najeeb and others 2003: para 10). Thisprovides a curious situation in which the labelling of offending is down played in relationto the associated punishment. To a lay person, the public order offences may sound moreserious than property offences but the actual punishment is greater, as riot carries amaximum sentence of ten years imprisonment and violent disorder five years; both lessersentences than for burglary.
BailMost defendants awaiting trial or sentence are presumptively entitled to release on bailunless there are substantial reasons to believe that they pose a risk to the public bycommitting further offences, interfering with witnesses or absconding (Bail Act 1976).The public disorder, of itself, was not a ground for refusing bail. Wells and Quick observedpreviously that ‘The use of bail conditions as a form of ‘informal’ punishment by the courtsis thus now well established’ (2010:222). Although remanded in accordance with theterms of the Bail Act 1976, as one magistrate cautioned, ‘it can be tempting to treat aremand in custody as a first bite at punishing an offender. That is not just wrong, but alsoillegal’ (Bystander 2011). Many of those remanded in custody were young and/or ofprevious good character (21.9% of all suspects and 36.3% of juveniles had no previousconvictions; MoJ 2012c) and were charged with only minor offences. Neither the MoJ northe MEN data gives detailed information about remand status. Leaked MetropolitanPolice guidance revealed that ‘a strategic decision has been made… that in all cases anapplication will be made for remand in custody both at the police station, and later atcourt’ (Operation Withern 2011). The Prison Governors Association President claimedthat magistrates were choosing custody rather than bail at a ‘much greater rate’ but thiswas disputed by the Magistrates’ Association Chairman (BBC 29 August 2011). OneManchester-based lawyer thought that ‘there was a blanket decision made in court beforethe first case was ever heard’ to refuse bail (Bawden and Bowcott 2012). There wereunderstandable concerns in the context of the on-going disorder that, if bail were granted,
15 The Ministry of Justice statistics do not distinguish the different public order offences. We foundsixteen convictions for riot following a search of the major online news websites. Seven wereconvicted in Nottingham for an attack on a police station (BBC 1 June 2012); eight for the incidentinvolving the shooting at a police helicopter in Birmingham (Lewis and others 2014).
8those released would commit further offences. Prosecutors noted that, once it was clearthe danger of more riots had passed, objections to bail were dropped in many cases anddefendants were released pending trial or sentence (Bawden and Bowcott 2012).We have no way of telling whether bail was refused for preventative or punitive reasons– or a combination of both - but prisoners, many of whom who were ultimately acquittedor given a community punishment, spent time remanded in custody, which again, undernormal circumstances, they would not have done. This additional ‘punishment’ is notconsidered part of the sentencing tariff and has the greatest impact on those whocommitted the least serious offences. If a defendant is given a custodial punishment, timeserved on remand is deducted but, in a case in which the sentence is a communitypunishment or fine, no such allowance can be made. Even one night in custody, forsomeone who has not experienced it before is likely to be a frightening experience(Gentleman 2011), even more so given the overcrowding following the riots.
VenueWhere a case is dealt with also affects the sentence that can be passed. Summary-onlyoffences must be disposed of in a magistrates’ court, with a maximum sentence of sixmonths imprisonment (or up to one year for two consecutive sentences) and a £5,000fine. Indictable-only cases must be heard before a judge and jury in the Crown Court, withsentences of up to life imprisonment in some cases. A category of intermediate offencesare known as triable either way: defendants can elect to be tried at the Crown Court, orcan be sent there if the sentencers think their powers are inadequate. During the riots,the Magistrates’ Association called for its members’ sentencing powers to be increased toone year’s imprisonment so that they could dispose of more cases. Looking at the MENdata (Table 1), assuming the same sentences would have been passed by the magistratesas were actually imposed at the Crown Court, this would have increased by forty per centthe number of cases that could have been dealt with summarily in Manchester, withassociated savings in both time and money in processing these cases. (the Ministry ofJustice figures do not give this level of detail).
INSERT TABLE 1 HEREMost of the offences charged during the disorder were triable either way including violentdisorder,16 theft and burglary. Existing guidance states that burglary of non-dwellingsshould usually be tried summarily unless there are particular aggravating features, whichdid not apply in most of these cases (Ministry of Justice 2013: part V.51.6). In its riotsguidance, the CPS altered this, stating that ‘Given the wider context and the likelysentence, offences of burglary involving the stealing of property from shops or stores,even of a seemingly opportunistic nature, are unlikely to be regarded as suitable forsummary trial’ (CPS 2011a). Again, this is a remarkable ratcheting up of the stakes.Magistrates were also told to consider committing cases to the Crown Court if they felttheir sentencing powers were insufficient (Bowcott and Bates 2011). Nearly two-thirds(65 per cent) of riot-related cases were sent to the Crown Court (MoJ 2012b).
16 Although the Charging Standards state that this would rarely be suitable for summarydisposition (CPS 2011a).
9Another factor to be considered is the allocation of cases at the magistrates’ court. Sincethe riot offences usually involved individuals offending in their own communities, theclaim for involving local representatives —lay magistrates—would appear to becompelling (Roberts 2013:236). Anecdotal evidence suggests instead that almost all riot-related cases dealt with summarily were assigned to district judges (Roberts and Hough2013:236). These legally qualified professionals are thought to hear cases moreexpeditiously than lay magistrates do; however, they are also more likely to imposecustodial sentences (Ipsos MORI 2011).All youths should be tried summarily, usually in the youth court, other than those chargedwith grave crimes, specified offences or those charged jointly with an adult. Riot, violentdisorder and non-residential burglary are not grave crimes. According to the MEN data,17 young people were tried by magistrates and two by the Crown Court, without theexpertise and protections of the youth courts. The two 17 year olds were each sentencedat Crown Court to eight months detention for burglary. It is not clear on what basis theircases were transferred to Crown Court, as the offences would seem to be at the lower endof the spectrum and their sentences fell within the capacity of the youth court.17 Movingthese cases from the youth courts has additional consequences for young defendants. Theautomatic reporting restrictions that apply in the youth courts to prevent the naming ofyoung offenders unless it is thought to be in the public interest (s. 39 Children and YoungPersons Act 1933) are merely discretionary in the magistrates’ and Crown Court. On 18August 2011, the CPS issued guidance advising prosecutors to ask that young defendantsshould be named if it is required in the public interest (CPS 2011). Almost thirty per centof juveniles in the MEN data were named. Once again, usual procedures were departedfrom with no debate, no explanation of why this was being done and no analysis of thepotential consequences for the young people involved.
SentenceThe courts have to consider certain factors when determining sentence. Section 142 ofthe Criminal Justice Act 2003 requires those passing sentence to take into account:[deserved] punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and reparation tovictims. The problem with this is that there is no hierarchy or means of deciding which ofthese, often contradictory, factors to apply. Following the riots, judges and magistrateswere faced with sentencing under intense media and political scrutiny. In the earliestcases, especially in Manchester, they were having to pass sentence whilst the disorderwas ongoing which meant that incapacitation was perhaps more of an issue. Committingan offence at a time of social disorder has long been regarded by the courts as deservingof greater punishment (Caird 1970). Following the 2001 Bradford riots, the Court ofAppeal set a descending tariff, starting at ten years imprisonment for ringleaders (Najeeb2003). Sentencers in 2011 had to decide by how much they should increase thepunishment to reflect the context of the disorder. Two factors meant that they could notjust follow Najeeb. The different nature of most of the offending in 2011 meant that the
17 One admitted burgling a city centre newsagents, which had already been attacked, having beencaught with cigarettes and jewellery. The other had handed herself in to police after her picturewas publicised. She had ‘gone into [a pawnbrokers] but left empty handed because she didn't seeanything she wanted’ (MEN data).
10
scale was not directly applicable in most cases.18 In addition, since Najeeb, the sentencingguidelines had come into effect, but these made no mention of sentencing in relation topublic disorder.19The definitive guidelines issued by the Sentencing Council are supposed to ensure aconsistent approach to sentencing, whilst allowing flexibility to reflect individual cases.Most offences are divided into three categories of severity, with starting points andsentence ranges for each level. In determining the offence category, an exhaustive list offactors is provided relating to harm and culpability. Sentencers are required to locate theappropriate starting point for the offence, and then adjust for any general and individual,aggravating and mitigating circumstances (sentencers have discretion as to which factorsto consider at this stage). In addition, they should make a reduction for a guilty plea;consider whether ancillary orders are appropriate or necessary; ensure that the totalsentence is proportionate to the offending behaviour and that it is properly balanced.Sentencers must also follow any relevant sentencing guidelines, ‘unless the court issatisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so’ (s 125(1) Coronersand Justice Act 2009). When a court imposes a sentence of a different type or outside therange provided, it must explain its reasons for so doing.The riots created ‘an unexpected and unwelcome challenge for the guidelines’ (Roberts2013:16). Her Majesty's Courts and Tribunals Service (the agency responsible for courtsadministration) instructed magistrates’ court clerks to advise magistrates to considerdisregarding normal sentencing guidelines. This had the, apparently counterintuitive,justification of ensuring consistency in sentencing across the country (Bowcott 2011).Crown Court judges decided to depart from the guidelines as well. Because publicdisorder was not on the list for determining the offence category, the courts decided thatthe guidelines were not applicable. The courts appeared to disregard, without discussion,the overarching Guideline on Seriousness20 that:The seriousness of an individual case should be judged on its own dimensionsof harm and culpability rather than as part of a collective social harm. It islegitimate for the overall approach to sentencing levels for particular offencesto be guided by their cumulative effect. However, it would be wrong to furtherpenalise individual offenders by increasing sentence length for committing anindividual offence of that type (Sentencing Guidelines Council 2004: F 1.38).Without the guidelines, there was no indication as to how sentences should be calculated.The Sentencing Council declined to publish emergency guidelines (s123 Coroners andJustice Act 2009) because some offences would be sentenced before any guidelines couldbe published and others afterwards, which could lead to inconsistency and complicatesubsequent appeals (Sentencing Council 2012:9).
18 Other than Lewis and others (2014).19 According to Gilmore (2010) when sentencing those convicted following violent protests outsidethe Israeli Embassy in 2009, the courts followed Najeeb in imposing deterrent sentences. We arenot aware of any discussion of these cases in relation to the 2011 disorder.20 This guideline deals with the general concept of seriousness in the light of the relevant statutoryprovisions and considers how sentencers should determine when sentencing thresholds havebeen crossed when applying the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
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In the absence of guidance, the Recorder of Manchester, Judge Gilbart QC, undertook ‘animportant and interesting initiative’ (Thomas 2011). Having concluded that the disordertook the offences ‘completely outside the usual context of criminality,’ he set out thehigher starting points and ranges of sentences which would be applied in the Crown Courtat Manchester for riot-related offending, including offences not yet before him (Carter and
others 2011). Judge Gilbart set as his starting point that ‘any adult offender… must expectto lose his or [her] liberty for a significant period’. The sentences were intended to ‘senda clear and unambiguous message … which I trust will deter others from engaging in thistype of behaviour in the future’ (para 11). Although not binding, Judge Gilbart’s commentswere regarded as ‘persuasive authority’ by judges in the Crown Court at other locations(Alagago and others 2011; Twemlow and others 2011).Of those tried in relation to the riots, 508 defendants (16%) were acquitted or had theircases dismissed (Ministry of Justice 2012b). Of the 2,138 individuals sentenced, 66 percent (n=1405) received an immediate custodial sentence with an average 17.1 months(compared to a figure of 3.7 months for similar cases in 2010; MoJ, 2012b). There werestark differences in the proportions receiving an immediate custodial sentence and theaverage length of sentences passed the previous year (see Figure 2). The uplift wasreplicated at both magistrates’ courts and Crown Court. At the magistrates’ courts, 36 percent were sentenced to immediate custody compared to 12 per cent for similar offencesin 2010 and the average custodial sentence rose from 2.5 to 6.6 months. At the CrownCourt, 85 per cent were sentenced to immediate custody (compared to 33 per cent in forsimilar offences in 2010) and average sentences rose from 11.3 to 19.6 months; a 73 percent increase (MOJ 2012b).
FIGURE 2 HERENot only is the public disorder context seen as an aggravating feature in sentencing, butalso factors that would normally be considered mitigation, such as previous goodcharacter are given less weight in such circumstances (Najeeb 2003; Blackshaw 2011,para 20). Ordinarily the level of culpability would be reduced if the offending wasspontaneous, or the offender had played only a minor role (Sentencing Guidelines Council2004 D 1.17 and D 1.25). Whilst the definitive guidelines issued by the Sentencing Councilcite ‘age and/or lack of maturity’ as a mitigating factor (Sentencing Council 2011), thishad little influence on the punishments issued to youngsters. Thirty-eight per cent ofthose sentenced in relation to the riots were juveniles (aged 11-17; MoJ 2012b). Thoseconvicted of riot-related offences in the youth courts were six times more likely to begiven custody than those convicted by the same courts for similar offences in 2010 (MoJ2012c). One youth court magistrate interviewed for Reading the Riots claimed the usual‘sentencing rulebook’ for children with no previous convictions had been ‘torn up andthrown away’ (Bawdon and Bowcott 2012a). In Lewis and others it was held that ‘theparticular circumstances of this case require the strong message to go out that those, ofwhatever age, who are tempted to become involved in this sort of group offending mustexpect significant deterrent sentences despite their youth’ (2014: para 181).The practical implications of this uplift should not be underestimated. Concerns havebeen expressed about the brutalising effects of contact with the criminal justice systemand incarceration and (especially for those who were previously of good character),
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which may in turn diminish their chances of reintegration into society on release (see e.g.,Haney 2013; McAra and McVie 2007). Prosecuting these cases has had additional socialand familial consequences for defendants, particularly those whose offending would notnormally have been pursued so vigorously. For example, the man sentenced for stealingan ice cream, described above, was recommended for deportation following his sentence,along with about 100 others nationwide (Wheatstone 2012). The Leader of ManchesterCity Council said that it would use its powers to evict those living in social housing whohad been involved or allowed their children to be involved in the disturbances (Leese2011). It is not clear to what extent ancillary orders were sought (such as curfews, non-entry to certain locations), but the CPS guidance emphasised seeking compensationorders (CPS 2011a; Section 130 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000).As of 10 August 2012, there had been 24 successful appeals against sentence from themagistrates’ courts and 13 from the Crown Courts (one had his sentence increased onappeal by the Attorney General; MoJ 2012c). The Court of Appeal will not vary a sentencemerely because it is harsh. It will only alter a sentence if it is ‘manifestly excessive’ (thatis the sentence was too high given the facts of the offence or in light of any availablepersonal mitigation) and/or ‘wrong in principle’ (if the judge made some mistake whenimposing the sentence). Its judgments, however, allow guidance to be given forsentencing future cases, an opportunity that was not fully utilised in these cases. Packerargued that appellate decisions are significant ‘because the appellate level of the criminalprocess is where the governing norms are made explicit’ (1963:232) and, in that respect,the decisions were more revealing.In Blackshaw (2011), the Lord Chief Justice delivered the judgment on ten joined appealsrelating to the riots (including six appeals from Manchester Crown Court). In upholdingeight of the sentences, the Court held that those who deliberately participated in thesedisturbances had committed aggravated crimes. Severe sentences, intended topunishment and deter, must follow as any participation in an unlawful or riotousassembly derives its gravity from the common and unlawful purpose, which is anessential feature in the assessment of culpability and harm. The Court confirmed that, asnone of the guidelines envisaged the public disorder, sentences beyond the usual rangewere ‘not only appropriate, but… inevitable’ (Blackshaw 2011, para 16).21 It held thatthese are long established principles and ‘Nothing in any sentencing guidelineundermines them or reduces their application.’ Whilst sentencers should consider anyrelevant guidelines, ‘the aphorism that sentencing guidelines were guidelines nottramlines, continued to be fully reflected in the present legislative framework’ (para 14).The Court upheld all of the burglary sentences but reduced those for handling stolengoods. The distinction appeared to be whether the defendant had played a direct part inthe disorder (Blackshaw 2011: para 132) or if ‘The defendant's crime stemmed from thispublic disturbance, but it was not intrinsic to it’ (para 140). Whilst deprecating the trialjudge’s attempts to set ‘ersatz guidelines’ (Roberts 2013:19-20), the Court gave no
21 The Court has rebuked judges for disregarding inadequate sentencing guidelines in other cases,noting the judge’s statutory obligation to take account of the guidelines and holding that ‘theirreconsideration is a matter for the Sentencing Guidelines Council and not for a trial judge’(Heathcote-Smith and Melton 2011: para 10).
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explanation of how cases should be sentenced once they were outside the sentencingguidelines. In reasoning that Ashworth describes as ‘strange and unconvincing’(2012:82), the Court made no mention of the ‘interests of justice’ exception, merelyholding that the requirement to follow the sentencing guidelines does not require ‘slavishadherence’ (Blackshaw 2011: para 13). It did not try to explain the quantum ofpunishment (‘a deterrent sentence… was not manifestly excessive’ (para 86); the overallsentence was…‘within the appropriate range (para 99); ‘Making due allowances for hisage and his personal disadvantages, the sentence was within the appropriate range’ (para107)). It did not seek to explain how or why these sentences were appropriate, forexample by examining what the offence would have attracted under normalcircumstances, then setting an additional penalty for the disorder. The Court did notattempt to justify its conclusions with reference to the relevant guidelines or theoverarching principles, even as a point of departure (Ashworth 2012: 95). No referencewas made as to why the cases crossed the threshold for custody (s152(2) Criminal JusticeAct 2003), or how the sentence was of the shortest term commensurate with theseriousness of the offences (s153(2) Criminal Justice Act 2003). The criminal justicesystem should be able to justify its decisions on a principled and proportionate basis.Whilst the sentences fell within the statutory maxima, they were far in excess of whatanyone could have forecast– including defence lawyers when advising their clients as totheir plea. In future riots, it would be difficult to predict a likely sentence based on thesecases.Several other appeals have followed,22 all of which have endorsed Blackshaw (2011). Theonly case in which the Court gave lengthy consideration to appropriate sentences was forthe considerably more serious conduct in Lewis and others (2014).23 It upheld the
Blackshaw principle of departing from the guidance, but gave a reasoned explanation asto why the sentences were appropriate, including comparisons with previous cases, thedefendants’ character, involvement, youth and future dangerousness. This was of limitedutility however as the seriousness of the offending means that it is a ‘case is probablyunique in the annals of public disorder in this country in recent times’ (para 1).
ConclusionThe disorder of August 2011 was commonly described as the worst in living memory dueto the speed with which it spread over such a wide geographical area. Extensive damagewas done, primarily to property rather than people, but the riots caused widespread fearand a clear desire for ‘something to be done’. Unlike previous riots, there has been nosystematic public inquiry (Scarman 1981; Gifford 1986) but there are important lessonsto be learned from the official responses to the situation. Thus far, attention has focusedon the police handling of the disorder and the views of those affected. This enquiry needsto be broadened in particular to include an appraisal of how each part of the criminaljustice system contributed to the sentencing ‘escalator’.
22 Adam Khan (2012), Anderson (2012), Challinor (2012), Bretherton (2011), Pilgrim (2011)and
Suleimanov (2013).23 This involved a group breaking into and setting fire to a public house in Birmingham. The policewere enticed to the scene then fired upon, including at least one shot at a police helicopter. ‘If theoffences in Blackshaw were serious, what happened here was in an altogether different and farmore serious league’ (para 167).
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Punishment is analysed largely in terms of sentences handed down by courts. Thesedeterminations are announced publicly and can be debated and amended for future casesif they are seen as inappropriate. Despite its duty to monitor the operation andeffectiveness of its guidance, including ‘the frequency with which, and the extent to which,courts depart from the sentencing guidelines’ (s128 Coroners and Justice Act 2009), theSentencing Council has not commented on or published findings in relation to the courtshaving systematically disregarded its guidance.Feinberg describes punishment as ‘a conventional device for the expression of attitudesor resentment and indignation … [it] has a symbolic significance largely missing fromother kinds of penalties’ (1994:73). There is undoubtedly a performative aspect to‘judgecraft’ (Moorhead and Cowan 2007; Baum 2006) and judges’ influence depends onthe reactions of politicians, the legal profession, academia the media and the public react(Garoupa and Ginsberg 2009:452). A local reporter who had watched many of the trialsdescribed them to us as being akin to show trials, with the district judge addressing thepress gallery as much as the defendants. Judges are influenced by the interaction betweenthe legal subculture (their professional norms and guidelines) and the democraticsubculture (shaped by public opinion; Richardson and Vines 1970). Whilst it is obviouslyimportant that judges are aware of public opinion, it is particularly important at times ofwidespread panic that they do not become merely ciphers for the loudest voices anddisregard their professional constraints. Whilst the offending may have been impulsive,sentencing should not be. The former Chair of the Criminal Bar Association, Paul MendelleQC cautioned that ‘people get caught up and act out of character, in a similar way, there isa danger that the courts themselves may get caught up in a different kind of collectivehysteria’ (BBC 17 August 2011). Adhering to the guidelines can ‘serve as a “circuitbreaker,” preventing bursts of punitiveness from affecting sentencing practices’ (Roberts2013: 15).Rather than abandoning the guidelines, the courts could, and arguably should, havetreated the public disorder as an aggravating factor rather than a reason for abandoningthe guidelines, thereby threatening both consistency and proportionality in sentencing(Roberts 2012). We concur with Roberts that ‘a systematic approach should be followedby courts - even when departing from a definitive sentencing guideline’ (2012:440) andthat this decision should be taken on an individual level rather than as a blanket decisionthat all disorder-related offending should fall outside the existing guidelines. The courtsare required to sentence within the offence range rather than the category, so theaggravating nature of the disorder could have been addressed by sentencing each case asthough it was in the sentencing category above that in which it would normally have beenplaced to reflect any additional punishment required. With one important distinction, thisis essentially what the Sentencing Council has done in the new Burglary OffencesDefinitive Guideline, which makes the ‘context of general public disorder’ a factorindicating greater harm. This means that the courts will be able to enhance the quantumof sentencing in future cases without abandoning all structure. Because the SentencingCouncil has put this factor in category one, the courts will be obliged to sentence offendersmore harshly in future – thus the Sentencing Council has added to the punitive escalator.Had it been put in category two, sentencers could have used their discretion to adjustsentences to reflect individuals’ culpability in the context of the disorder. Some confusion
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remains however. Whilst the Burglary Guideline has been amended so that cases shouldbe dealt with within the existing guidelines; no such provision applies to theft, publicorder, arson or sexual offences. It is unclear whether in future the courts would follow
Blackshaw (2011) in disapplying the guidelines, or extend the Burglary Guideline byanalogy.Sentencing those who commit the most serious conventional riotous offences is relativelyclear now (Najeeb 2003, Lewis and others 2014). The greatest lack of clarity and itappears, the most punitive sentences, may be imposed on those whose conduct, of itself,is less serious, but for the riotous context. A closer examination of these cases suggeststhat sentencing cannot be considered in isolation.Discretion in the charging and prosecution process is especially significant insituations of disorder; typically involving large numbers of people, they invitea policy of selective enforcement… Yet the principles on which such aselection proceeds at successive stages – arrest, questioning, charge, finaldecision to prosecute – remain unarticulated and thus unaccountable. (Wellsand Quick 2010:218).All the agencies were working under great pressure to restore order and the courts madeit clear that they saw their role as being to pass enhanced sentences to reinforce notionsof punishment and deterrence. One factor that has been neglected is the driving impetusof the CPS in sentencing, taking decisions that are both enormously significant and largelyunreviewable. Retribution and deterrence have been pursued by the CPS, a factor notanalysed in this way hitherto. In their 1991 book, McConville et al described policedominance of the charging process and the CPS as confining itself to testing the sufficiencyof evidence. The riots illustrated how that has changed.Some scholars have contested whether or not the criminal justice apparatus can properlybe termed a system (Feeney 1985; Pullinger 1985). Sentencing in relation to the riotsexemplifies this problem. Each stage of the process considered its treatment of theoffender in isolation; applying an uplift, whether for pragmatic or punitive purposes. Theimpact of this cumulative uplift and its impact on the individual were never consideredholistically by sentencers. Under normal circumstances, individuals who stole a bottle ofwater or left a premises without having stolen anything would be very unlikely to bearrested; if arrested, they probably be cautioned or released; if charged they would rarelybe remanded in custody; they would be dealt with at the magistrates’ court (or the youthcourt); and if sentenced, they would receive a light sentence. The riot-related offendersreceived an ‘uplift’ at every step of the process – a factor which does not appear to havebeen taken into account in sentencing. As Feeley (1979) argued, ‘the process is thepunishment’ and this should be taken into consideration in issuing and applying guidancefor sentencing future riot-related conduct.
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disorder between 6 and 9 August in England and Wales
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Table 1: Nature of sentence and length of sentence dispensed by court type in Manchester
Length of
sentence
Manchester
Youth Court
Manchester
Magistrates’
Manchester
Crown Court TotalUnknown 0 4 0 4Non-custodial 3 10 1 14Under 3 months 0 2(1) 0 23-6 months 2 10 2 (2) 146-12 months 4 4 17 (5) 251-2 years 0 0 39(1) 392-3 years 0 0 9 93-4 years 0 0 2(1) 24-5 years 0 0 1 1Total 9 30 (1) 71 (9) 110* numbers in parentheses are suspended sentences
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